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Abstract 
 
Billions of dollars are now spent annually in the United States and Europe for spatially 
delineated environmental services such as agricultural landscape management and river 
restoration programs, yet little is known about the spatial distribution of the benefits from these 
policies. This paper develops a framework for recovering information on this question from the 
spatial pattern of votes cast for referenda on the provision of spatially delineated public goods. 
We specify a model linking voter support for environmental improvement to the distance at 
which such improvements are expected to occur. The empirical application is to a river 
restoration referendum in the Swiss canton of Bern. Our results indicate that the benefits from 
river restoration have a strong local component, sufficiently strong that voter approval would 
not occur if only canton-wide benefits were at stake. Surprisingly, support for river restoration 
is no greater, and in some specifications is actually lower, in locations where rivers are a 
prominent feature in the environment.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many traditional public services such as ambulances or national defence have benefits accruing 
to fairly well-defined local, state or national populations. However, there is a range of more 
recent public policy interventions with a distinct spatial dimension, many related to aspects of 
environmental quality, for which the spatial distribution of benefits is not obvious. 
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Environmental examples are the restoration of natural habitats and protection of endangered 
species and ordinary wildlife. Individuals value such programs, even though they necessarily 
occur apart from where people actually live. Examples from an urban setting include 
community redevelopment, planning programs and crime reduction initiatives. 
It seems useful to distinguish two levels at which questions regarding the spatial 
analysis of benefits can be addressed, each with its specific applied potential. 
The first, qualitative level concerns the spatial range over which any willingness to pay 
(WTP) for the local public good is observed or, in other words, the “extent of the market”. 
Information about the spatial range of benefits alone (without quantification of these benefits) 
would be useful for assigning responsibilities to appropriate levels of government in a federal 
state. If the jurisdictions responsible for decision-making and financing of a public service 
reflect the range and distribution of its benefits, then efficient provision is compatible with 
democratic decision-making (Oates 1972, Cornes and Sandler 1996, Loomis 2000). 
Additionally, the spatial extent of damages from environmental degradations is a controversial 
and contentious question that arises in assessing natural resource damages. According to Smith 
(1993, p. 21) “Definitions of the extent of the market are probably more important to the values 
attributed to environmental resources as assets than any changes that might arise from refining 
our estimates of per unit values.” 
The second, quantitative level of analysis is more demanding and concerns the 
magnitude of willingness to pay as a function of the distance and quantity or “scope” of the 
spatially delineated resource damage or improvement. Such information is needed if the 
purpose of the analysis is to obtain monetary estimates of resource damages or benefits of 
proposed policies. How do individuals value the distance and quantity or abundance of any 
resource to be protected? Intuition suggests that an individual would be willing to pay more to 
raise a resource to any given level of quality if the resource is close to the individual and if the 
extent of the resource is large rather than small. For instance, raising the quality of local rivers 
to a pristine level would seem more important if rivers are close to settlements and if they 
dominate the landscape than if they are distant and relatively inconsequential in scope. While 
this reasoning may be plausible, the question cannot be answered without empirical evidence.  
There are in principle several options for addressing empirical questions on the spatial 
distribution (and basic character) of such preferences. Perhaps the most frequently used method 
for the generic problem of measuring public good benefits is contingent valuation, in which 
surveyors ask respondents their willingness to pay for hypothetical variations in a public good. 
Hedonic wage and housing price studies constitute a second approach, in which values are 
inferred from the price differential individuals pay or receive for public goods consumed as a 
consequence of living in a certain neighbourhood or working at a certain job. A third method, 
based on a specific political model, links attributes of a jurisdiction’s median citizen with 
public good outcomes. Each of these approaches has been criticised on various grounds (Kahn 
and Matsusaka, 1997). We are unaware, however, of any study that has examined the spatial 
nature of benefits with results from referendum voting.  
Relying on ballot choices is attractive in cases where public good levels are decided by 
referenda. In such cases, the individual’s voting choice reveals a preference. Observations on 
these revealed preferences, together with relevant prices and individual attributes, can in 
principle provide information on benefits received in the same way that individual 
consumption choices reveal benefits in a conventional market setting (Bowen 1943, Deacon 
and Shapiro 1975, Noam 1981, Kahn and Matsusaka 1997). The electoral process often 
provides information on the pros and cons of different ballot options prior to elections, so 
voters are exposed to relevant information. There is no need to assume that the good in 
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question can be enjoyed only by those who reside in a particular location or are employed in a 
particular job. Finally, one need not invoke a particular theory of political outcomes in order to 
draw inferences; an assumption that individuals are informed and vote in their self interest is 
sufficient. 
Our aim is thus to develop and apply a framework for analyzing the basic character and 
spatial distribution of benefits for a spatially heterogeneous public good, based on preferences 
revealed through voting on referenda. Unlike most empirical voting studies we do not assume 
that all voters consume the same level of public good ex ante, or that they face exactly the 
same potential public good augmentation. Rather, we incorporate the fact that pre-policy public 
good levels generally differ across space and also allow voters’ expectations on public good 
augmentations to vary spatially. Further, the public good we examine is restoration of an 
environmental resource to a more natural quality, and the abundance of this resource varies 
spatially as well. By exploiting this spatial variation in abundance, or quantity, we also shed 
light on how ex ante quality and quantity interact in determining the value individuals place on 
restoration of the resource.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature on 
voting models and spatial analysis of public good benefits. Section 3 develops the empirical 
model for the specific context of river restoration. Section 4 presents the empirical application 
and results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Background 
 
Spatial distribution of public-good benefits 
 
Two main approaches have so far been used to examine the spatial distribution of the benefits 
of public goods, the hedonic pricing technique and contingent valuation. 
 Hedonic property pricing models are particularly appropriate to the task as they 
specifically reveal buyers’ preferences over housing attributes, including local public goods. 
Geographic information systems (GIS) can be used to construct variables for local public 
goods based on spatial relationships between the observed properties and the public goods of 
interest. A number of studies used this approach to estimate the benefits of proximity to open 
space (Irwin 2002, Geoghegan et al. 1997, Geoghegan 2002, Acharya and Bennett 2001). All 
of these found that, when compared to residential, commercial or industrial uses, open space 
located within a given distance from a property has a positive impact on property price. 
Another series of studies found that house prices were negatively affected by animal 
production facilities within given distances (Abeles and Connor 1990, Palmquist et al. 1997, 
Herriges et al. 2005, Ready and Abdalla 2005). Several studies found that the observed effects 
depended on the distance between the individual house and the environmental effect examined 
(e.g. Palmquist et al. 1997, Geoghegan et al. 1997, Mahan et al. 2000, Acharya and Bennett 
2001, Ready and Abdalla 2005). This literature is reviewed in Ready and Abdalla (2005). 
However, an important limitation of these studies is that they are only able to recover values to 
the extent they are reflected in housing prices. 
 Contingent valuation (CV) can in principle be applied to any type and spatial scale of 
public goods. Loomis (2000) includes distance to policy sites in models of stated WTP for 
wildlife protection programs. Using the estimated distance-decay parameters he computes the 
percentage of total economic benefits that fall within the relevant state or regional jurisdictions. 
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Other studies that estimated benefits based on distance decay functions include Pate and 
Loomis (1997), Bateman and Langford (1997), Bateman et al. (2000) and Bateman et al. 
(2006). However, when validity tests are built into survey designs, researchers sometimes find 
that stated willingness to pay for improvements seems to decay too slowly with distance to be 
consistent with economic theory. Hanley et al. (2003) found that the distance-decay of stated 
WTP for improving one arbitrarily selected river of the Thames region implied aggregate 
values that were substantially higher than the benefits implied by the same respondents’ stated 
values for improving all rivers of the region. This result is closely related to findings in the 
literature on “scope effects” or “embedding effects” in CV which addresses effects of the 
quantity of a good more generally (rather than of its spatial dimensions).1 
Furthermore, proximity to environmental resources has been an issue in the literature on 
the appropriate extent and definition of the market in cost-benefit analysis based on hedonic 
models (e.g. Michaels and Smith 1990) and models of recreation demand (e.g. Smith and Kopp 
1980, Whittington and MacRae 1986, McConnell 1990, Phaneuf and Smith 2005). In the 
analysis of recreation demand, the definition of the choice sets and (perceived) geographic 
extent of the market have been found to strongly affect welfare estimates, raising important 
questions about the correct conceptual treatment of researcher-defined or endogenous choice 
sets or choice boundaries (Parsons 1991, Parsons et al. 2000, Phaneuf and Smith 2005).  
Voter preferences have not been systematically used for assessing the spatial range and 
distribution of the benefits of natural resources. In the analysis of voter preferences for 
spatially explicit public goods, the examined market and choice set is clearly, although perhaps 
somewhat arbitrarily, defined by the boundaries of the jurisdiction making the decision about 
financing and by the public good proposal. Due to this distinctive characteristic, the analysis of 
voter preferences has the potential to provide insights about the spatial distribution of 
willingness to pay for public goods that are complementary to those obtained with the other 
approaches.  
 
Voting models 
 
Two of the earliest studies to use voting data to infer public good demand are Deacon and 
Shapiro (1975) and Fischel (1979), both of which yielded suggestive but promising results 
from state-wide environmental referenda. In another early study Rubinfeld (1977) examined 
individual voting data on an educational referendum and estimated the relative effects of 
income and tax obligation on voting choices. More recently, Kline and Wilchens (1994) related 
voting returns on open space referenda in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island to such 
socioeconomic determinants as housing price appreciation, population growth, and farmland 
loss. Kline and Wilchens (1994) subsequently examined votes from 16 environmental 
propositions, focusing on the role of income as a determinant of votes cast and on factors 
linked to the costs a policy imposes. Kotchen and Powers (2006) and Nelson et al. (2007) 
extended the literature by examining determinants of the overall vote totals for a large number 
of open space referenda, emphasizing the factors that contribute to the appearance of such 
referenda as well as the effect of funding mechanisms on voter approval.2 While the main 
intent of the preceding studies was to better understand the factors that influence public good 
                                                 
1 McFadden (1994), for instance, finds that WTP for 57 wilderness areas was only about fifty percent higher than 
WTP for one wilderness area alone. However, Smith and Osborne (1996) clarify that all we can say is that the 
WTP for a larger amount of a resource should be greater or equal to the WTP for a smaller amount. 
2 Noam (1981, 1982) modelled both the decision of whether to vote or abstain and the ballot choice if a vote was 
cast. The resulting approach was used to examine demands for a variety of public goods in Swiss cantons. 
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demands, other researchers have examined voting data with the intent of validating CV 
estimates of environmental benefits. Schläpfer and Hanley (2006) developed a method for 
recovering willingness to pay from aggregate voting data and tax schedules and compared the 
resulting estimates to CV results. 
None of these studies has examined the spatial pattern of votes in connection with 
spatial variation in public good provision. Kotchen and Powers (2006) find that outcomes vary 
for different levels of government and interpret this as suggesting spatial spill-ins between 
jurisdictions and a spatial dimension to open space benefits. They do not pursue this point, 
however. Vossler and Kerkvliet (2003) consider a potential role of distance to the proposed 
local public good. However, they include distance only in sub-models to explain participation 
in their survey (where distance turned out to be non-significant), and not in the analysis of the 
respondents’ reported voting choices. Schläpfer and Hanley (2003) and Schläpfer and Witzig 
(2006) use ad-hoc specifications to relate approval rates in voting decisions about the provision 
of public goods to local levels of these public goods. The former study found that increased 
public financing of landscape amenities was positively associated with local (municipal) levels 
of these amenities. The latter study related local support for regional-level river restoration to 
local river “naturalness” as measured by eco-morphological data. The authors find some 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that demand increases with decreasing naturalness of local 
rivers. 
We contribute to this literature by developing a model that permits inferences on the 
spatial range of public goods to be drawn from the spatial pattern of votes on public good 
enhancement. The specific context we examine is a public referendum to restore rivers to a 
more natural state in the Swiss canton of Bern. While the model we develop is formulated with 
this policy in mind, it may be applicable to other situations where public good provision has a 
clear spatial component, such as flood control, open space preservation, or even the 
introduction of large predators3. This framework is then applied to the river restoration dataset 
of Schläpfer and Witzig (2006) and the questions posed earlier, regarding the effect on WTP of 
distance from the voter and the local abundance of the resource to be restored, are examined 
empirically. 
The present study moves beyond the descriptive analysis of Schläpfer and Witzig 
(2006) by specifically testing for evidence of a spatial (distance) gradient in public good 
amenity benefits. We develop an analytical framework that links three important ingredients to 
the individual’s voting decision: the individual’s tax liability from the proposed tax policy, the 
ex ante quality and quantity of river segments at different distances from the voter, and the 
degree of expected enhancement for these river segments. This framework sheds light on the 
rate at which public good benefits diminish (if at all) with distance from the voter and can in 
principle identify the spatial limit at which they disappear. The model formalizes certain 
intuitive arguments made in Schläpfer and Witzig (2006), but also has a broader set of 
implications and leads to different empirical specifications and interpretations of results. Under 
the hypothesis that enhancement benefits decline with distance, the empirical model specifies 
that yes votes depend on the quality and abundance of rivers (separately and interacted) in 
various non-overlapping distance zones from the voter. Tests of the local public good 
hypothesis are then based on the partial derivative of yes votes with respect to quality in 
successive zones.4 In further tests, we allow for the possibility that the benefits of river 
                                                 
3 I this last example, the spatial relationship may not be monotonic. However, our model does not require a 
particular monotonic relationship, but rather allows the distance/value relationship to have any shape. 
4 Such tests are not possible in the specification of Schläpfer and Witzig (2006), which includes average river 
quality in a single distance zone. 
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enhancement differ between urban and more rural environments and consider linear and 
threshold effects of the amenity’s abundance. We use a more carefully derived set of control 
variables in all specifications, including fixed effects for administrative districts to allow for 
spatial heterogeneity, as well as variables for percent owner occupied housing (to allow for the 
possibility that voters expect enhancement benefits to be capitalized into property values) and 
for employment in the construction industry. Finally, to indicate the importance of a local 
component to river enhancement we compute predicted voting outcomes under a counter 
factual situation in which voters expect the referendum to have no effect on local river quality, 
but to affect river quality elsewhere. These results indicate that the local component of river 
enhancement benefits was decisive to the referendum’s passage.  
 
 
 
3. Model 
 
The spatial distribution of votes should reflect the spatial distribution of benefits voters 
perceive from improving river quality at various distances from where they live.5 For example, 
suppose the quality of a single river is to be improved and river quality is a nationwide public 
good so the benefits consumers experience are independent of their distance from the 
improvement. In this case, assuming identical tastes, incomes and tax liabilities, voters at all 
locations will be equally likely to vote in favour of restoring this single river. Alternatively, if 
river quality is a local public good so the benefits from improvement diminish with distance, 
then those living near the river will be more inclined to vote for an improvement than those 
living far away.  
Similar reasoning can be applied to the spatial pattern of voting on a nationwide 
referendum that would enhance river quality at all locations. If river quality is a nationwide 
public good then (assuming identical incomes, tastes, etc.) voters living near degraded rivers 
and voters living near pristine rivers will be equally likely to vote in favour. This is true 
because river enhancement at any location would confer identical benefits on all voters, 
regardless of where they live. If the benefits from enhancement decline with distance from the 
voter, however, voters living near degraded rivers will be more likely to vote for the proposal 
than those living near pristine rivers. There are two reasons for this: voters near degraded rivers 
are likely to have a high marginal utility for improvement, and (at least in the context we 
examine) the proposed policy is likely to yield greater improvement for degraded rivers than 
for more pristine rivers.  
Our empirical strategy follows this reasoning.  We model the individual’s voting decision 
in such a way that, controlling for tastes, incomes and tax liabilities, the correlation between 
yes votes and the ex ante quality of rivers in the voter’s local area can be interpreted as 
evidence on the local versus nationwide character of river enhancement benefits. Along the 
way, we introduce a feature that allows us to address the question of whether or not preferences 
for river restoration depend on the ‘quantity’ or extent of nearby rivers that would be restored.  
We recognize the possibility that variations in local river quality might be capitalized in 
housing prices, in which case votes for and against a quality enhancement would depend on 
factors other than the utility the voter gets from a quality improvement; in particular, the voting 
                                                 
5 The referendum we examine sought to enhance to ‘naturalness’ of rivers by altering river beds and embankments 
toward a more natural condition. Because the term naturalness is somewhat awkward, we often use ‘quality’ as an 
alternative term and use quality enhancement when referring to the referendum’s goal. 
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choice might depend on whether the voter is a net demander or net supplier of housing. For the 
sake of simplicity we do not incorporate this feature in our model, but we do allow for it 
informally in our empirical specification.6 Throughout, we assume that residents vote 
myopically in the sense that they ignore any migration among communities that may result 
from changing the pattern of river quality across communities in the country.7 
Let i index individual voters and their locations and let j = 0, …, J index a set of discrete 
distance zones relative to voter i. Because a river’s quality can be different at different points 
along its flow, we define segments for each river and frame our analysis in terms of quality in 
these segments. Assume the utility voter i enjoys from a given river segment, k, depends on the 
distance zone in which the segment is located. River segment k is defined to be in distance 
zone j relative to voter i if ),[ 1+∈ jjikd δδ , where dik is the distance from voter i to river segment 
k and the jδ are discrete distances indexed in increasing order. We express utility as follows: 
 
 ( )iii ZUU φ,,, ii xq= , (1) 
 
where { },,...,, 21 iJii qqq≡iq { }iJii xxx ,...,, 21≡ix  and ijq and ijx  are measures of the quality and 
abundance of rivers in distance zone j relative to voter i. Zi is i’s consumption of a numeraire 
private good and φi is a preference parameter. Utility is assumed to be increasing in Zi, but we 
make no assumptions on the way in which ijq and ijx enter.   
 We examine a referendum that proposed to improve river quality and indicate the 
change i anticipated as a shift from 0
i
q to i
0 qq
i
Δ+ . The minimum expenditure required for i to 
attain utility level Ui given existing river quality at different distances is written  
 
 ),,,( iii Uee φii xq= . (2) 
 
Voter i’s constant utility willingness to pay for the proposed change is given by 
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6 A more thorough examination of this point is available from the authors. 
7 Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001) examine this myopic voter specification as well as an alternative, more 
sophisticated specification in which voters take public good policies (and resident utilities) in other jurisdictions 
as given and anticipate migration in response to changes in their own jurisdiction’s public good choices. They find 
evidence supporting the latter view for provision of local public education. While acknowledging the growing 
evidence on local public good-induced migration and sorting, we defend our simplifying assumption with two 
arguments: (i) the policy change we study applied uniformly to all of the communities we examine (although its 
impact on river quality was expected to differ among communities) and (ii) the utility shifts, and hence attractions 
to migration, likely to result from the policy we study are arguably  small in comparison to the utility differentials 
that arise in the contexts where such sorting has been observed empirically. We comment further on the likely 
extent of migration induced by this referendum in the next section.  
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where the integral in the second line is taken over a sectionally smooth path, C, 
from 0
i
q to i
0 qq
i
Δ+ .8 If river quality in only a single zone changes, willingness to pay is the 
area under i’s constant utility marginal willingness to pay for quality in that zone, between the 
pre- and post-policy quality levels. If quality in several zones changes, willingness to pay can 
be interpreted as a sequential sum of such integrals for individual zones taken in any order. 
With the policy’s benefit expressed in this fashion, intuition suggests that lower levels of initial 
river quality and greater expected degrees of quality enhancement will both be associated with 
votes in favour of the referendum. If public good benefits have a local component in the sense 
described earlier, then (other things equal) yes votes should be more strongly associated with 
river enhancements )( ijdq at locations near the voter than those located farther away. In 
principle, the spatial (distance) extent of such local benefits can be identified as the distance at 
which this association disappears. We cannot test for the presence or strength of economy-wide 
public good benefits from river enhancement, since by definition such effects would not vary 
in our sample. 
 
Person i will vote yes on the proposed policy if 
 
 0≥Δ−≡ iii TWN  (4) 
 
where iTΔ is i’s tax liability. For simplicity we assume indifferent voters vote yes. Although tax 
liabilities are not observed directly, the revenue source is known to be an income tax. We 
approximate the tax linearly as dii IT 10 ττ += , where diI is disposable income.9 We assume the 
project’s financing comes from an increase in the marginal tax rate 1τ , which implies 
d
ii IT 1τΔ=Δ . The iqΔ  terms in Wi are not observed either, but the greatest enhancements were 
expected to occur on the most degraded river segments.  This expectation is incorporated as 
follows: jiqqq ijij ,)(
0* ∀−=Δ λ , where [ ]1,0∈λ . That is, we assume voters expected all rivers 
to be improved toward a common quality target, q*, with the degree of improvement 
proportional to the initial quality gap.  
 The hypotheses tested shortly are largely motivated by prior expectations about the 
shape of the willingness to pay function ),,,,( iiUW φii0i xqq Δ . First, W is expected to be 
decreasing in initial river quality at each distance zone, due to diminishing marginal 
willingness to pay. Second, willingness to pay is expected to be increasing in the components 
of iqΔ , the expected improvement in various zones; given the expectation that quality increases 
would be smaller for higher quality river zones, this reinforces the expectation that willingness 
to pay will be lower when initial river quality is high. Third, the role of river abundance in 
willingness to pay could in principle be complex. Intuitively, we expect greater willingness to 
pay for quality enhancement where rivers are abundant, 0/ >∂∂ ixW . Quality and abundance 
may also interact in voter preferences. If ex ante quality is high, we expect abundance to have 
little effect on willingness to pay for quality enhancement because any quality improvement 
will be minimal. If ex ante river quality is low, we expect the abundance of rivers nearby to 
have a strong effect on willingness to pay for quality enhancement because the change in 
                                                 
8 This is from the fundamental theorem of the calculus for vector valued functions; see Taylor (1955) p. 471, ff. 
9 If the tax is linear in before-tax income it can also be expressed as a linear function of disposable income, which 
simplifies the notation. 
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quality is large. This translates into an expectation that 0/ 02 <∂∂∂ ijiji xqW .  We test these 
empirical propositions by allowing river abundance to enter the willingness to pay function 
additively and interacted with quality.10  
 Making appropriate substitutions for iqΔ and iTΔ , i’s net-of-tax willingness to pay for 
river enhancement can be written: 
 
  ),,,( i
d
ii INN φi0i xq= . (5) 
 
We have replaced Ui by diI for empirical purposes because utility is monotonic in disposable 
income. Notice that diI could enter positively or negatively, depending on whether marginal 
benefits progress more or less rapidly with income than tax liabilities.  
 To move from a criterion for the individual voting decision, which we do not observe, 
to the voting proportion in a community, which we do observe, we treat iN as a random 
variable with fixed variance and a mean that depends on the community’s mean attributes, 
d
mI and mφ , where the index m indicates the community to which i belongs: 
 
 im
d
mmmi INN εφ += ),,,( xq0 . (6) 
 
Recall that initial river quality and river abundance are identical for all individuals in a given 
community. The error term εi is assumed to be logistically distributed with ( ) 0=iE ε  and fixed 
variance. The probability of observing a yes vote in community m is  
 
 )],,,([)Pr( m
d
mmm INFyes φxq 0=  (7) 
 
where F is the logistic cdf. 
To summarize, equation (7) implies that the probability of observing a yes vote in a 
given community depends on the community’s average disposable income, on preference 
attributes and on pre-policy levels of river quality and river abundance in various distance 
zones. A finding that this probability varies negatively with initial river quality would be 
consistent with the hypothesis that there is a local public good component to preferences for 
river quality. This conclusion would be strengthened if the correlations become weaker with 
distance from the voter, and in this case the rate of decline would indicate the rate at which 
local public good benefits diminish with distance. Clearly, such findings would tell us nothing 
about the presence or absence of economy-wide public good benefits, however, since such 
benefits would be equally available at all distances and would not vary in our sample. The role 
of river abundance in voter preferences is addressed by considering specifications that include 
river abundance in different distance zones as discussed earlier. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 We specify that any preference interaction between river quality and river abundance to be confined to the same 
distance zone. 
10 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
The river restoration initiative in the Swiss canton of Bern 
 
In Switzerland as in other parts of the world (e.g. Bernhardt et al. 2005) many rivers have been 
regulated over the past decades to gain agricultural land and to prevent flooding. Regulation 
often occurred in ways that decreased perceived aesthetic and recreational value. Such 
regulated rivers typically follow a straight line over large stretches, steep banks prevent safe 
and comfortable access to the water, natural riparian vegetation– which can also serve as a 
buffer zone against agricultural runoff – was often removed. The resulting homogenous river 
beds provide poor habitat for fish, which is reflected in a substantial decrease of fish 
populations over the past decades.11 Rather in contrast to the situation in many parts of the US,  
recreational anglers are only a very small fraction of the population, and the benefits typically 
associated with river restoration are mainly enhanced landscape quality for local and regional 
recreation such as walking, jogging or weekend picnics and perceived benefits for wildlife and 
plants more in general. 
In November1997 the citizens of the Swiss canton of Bern were called to vote on a 
proposal to establish a cantonal fund for river restoration.12 The objective was to restore near-
natural river environments (beds and embankments) with native flora and fauna and enhanced 
aesthetic and recreational value. The initiative demanded that 10 percent of the cantonal 
revenues from water licences, about 3 million SFR per year, be allocated to a fund for river 
restoration projects in the canton of Bern. The initiative explicitly stated that water fees would 
not be increased. This fact was also highlighted in the official voter information. Nevertheless, 
it was clear that the increase of expenditures for river restoration was an additional expenditure 
and would therefore have to be balanced by a corresponding increase of the revenues generated 
through direct taxes on income. The total percentage of yes votes among valid votes was 54.1 
percent. The popular initiative thus prevailed in the vote (Canton of Bern 1997). The voter 
turnout was 21.1 percent which is low but not unusual for a cantonal referendum of relatively 
minor importance. As there were four items on the ballot, the turnout was not specific to the 
river restoration issue. 
 Based on articles published in the local newspaper Berner Zeitung, the opponents did 
not openly question the need for river restoration but argued that the proposed fund would 
restrict the budgetary authority of the cantonal parliament and executive in financially difficult 
times. Proponents were conservation organizations, the cantonal and local anglers’ associations 
and representatives of the construction industry.  
 
Definition of variables 
 
The voting data we examine are aggregate vote proportions in 366 municipalities of the canton 
of Bern, reported in the canton’s voting protocols (Canton of Bern 1997). These municipalities, 
the smallest units of local government in Switzerland, vary in population from less than 100 to 
over 100,000 (City of Bern.) 
                                                 
11 Since the early 1980’s, the reported trout catch by the roughly 240,000 Swiss anglers has decreased by 60%. 
Over the same period, the ratio of successful angling trips declined from 78% to 24%, while the trip duration 
remained the same (Burkhardt-Holm et al. 2005). 
12 Schläpfer and Witzig (2006) provide a descriptive empirical analysis of voting results and an extended 
discussion of the politics leading up to the vote. 
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Information describing the eco-morphological status of the rivers in the study area at 
the time of the referendum was available from a detailed geo-referenced dataset of the Water 
and Soil Protection Laboratory of the Canton of Bern (WSPL 2003). This dataset describes the 
status of each river segment, which was field-recorded following procedures defined by the 
Federal Office of Environment (FOEFL 1999). The dataset also contains a variable 
“naturalness” ranging from 1 (for underground river channel) to 5 (for “natural or near-natural 
status”), which we use as an indicator of quality. Naturalness is defined based on a scoring of 
several eco-morphological attributes, including variability of river width, extent and type of 
bed stabilization, extent and type of embankment stabilization, width of riparian zone and 
vegetation cover. The attribute data are linked to a digital vector map of the rivers and the 
vector dataset of the rivers was linked with a vector map containing municipal boundaries and 
town centers (Swisstopo 1999). A comprehensive documentation of the dataset is available in 
WSPL (2003) and FOEFL (1999). Variables qij for the weighted mean naturalness and xij for 
the density of river segments (in meters of length per square km of area) within a given 
distance band j from the municipal centers (and situated within the canton of Bern) were 
derived using standard tools in ArcGIS 9.0. Our empirical analysis focuses on these variables 
for the distance bands 0–5 km, 0–2 km and 2–5 km. As indicated earlier we also examine the 
sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of river abundance, xij.  
Mean income per taxpayer for municipalities was computed from the total of reported 
net incomes in the tax period 1997/1998 and the number of taxpayers (“normal cases and 
special cases with a direct federal tax burden”) as reported in the federal tax administration’s 
publication for the tax period 1999/2000 (FTA 2004).  
We examined several additional explanatory variables to account for possible variations 
in voter preferences linked to local socioeconomic, cultural and hydrological factors. The 
rationale for each of these is explained as results are presented. Population density in the voting 
districts (municipalities) was derived from the 1990 federal census data (Federal Office of 
Statistics 2006) and land surface data from the Canton of Bern Office for Municipalities and 
Spatial Planning (OMSP) (2002). The percentage of homes that are owner occupied and the 
proportion of the population employed in the construction sector were provided by the Federal 
Office of Statistics.13 Language dummies (for Germanic, French and mixed language and 
cultural background) and region dummies for Jura, Prealps and Alps (for four main geographic 
regions with Swiss Plateau as the reference) are based on data from the Office of 
Municipalities and Spatial Planning, Canton of Bern (OMSP 2002). A dummy variable for the 
occurrence of water related damage by floods and landslides was coded based on the flood and 
landslide database of the Federal Research Institute WSL, Birmensdorf (Hegg et al. 2000). 
This variable indicates whether a municipality had been a “main affected municipality” of a 
flood or landslide at least once during the ten-year period prior to the referendum. Finally, 
district dummies were coded for the twenty-six administrative districts of the canton of Bern. 
Brief variable definitions and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. 
 For 11 small municipalities, vote totals were reported only for groups of communities, 
so votes cast could not be spatially related to river attributes precisely. A similar problem arises 
for a few ‘fragmented’ municipalities comprised of non-contiguous land areas, each with their 
own center. We chose to drop those voting districts, yielding a dataset with 366 observations.  
 
                                                 
13 The percent owner occupied in 1997 was estimated by linear interpolation from data on percent owner occupied 
in 1990 and 2000. 
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Estimation 
 
The dependent variable in empirical models is the log odds of the proportion voting yes, 
Logit(yes). In estimation the observed number of yes votes in a community of n voters is 
treated as the result of n Bernoulli trials. The observed proportion voting yes then equals the 
true probability of a yes vote plus a sampling error. This leads to a well-known minimum chi-
squared estimator, which is implemented by a two-step weighted least squares procedure.14 A 
desirable feature of this estimator is that it weights observations by the total vote, therefore 
assigning greater weight to larger communities.15 To achieve the same end, the summary 
statistics and simple correlations reported below are weighted by the municipality’s total vote. 
Voters in each community are treated as if they all reside at the community’s center. 
Average river quality and river abundance are measured in a set of circular zones around each 
community’s center. These zones are small, never exceeding a 5 km. radius. Because the 
largest concentric zone is very small relative to the entire country, river quality and abundance 
in the rest of the country (outside the largest concentric zone examined) are treated as identical 
for all communities and are absorbed in the constant term. A finding that the coefficients of 
river quality are all zero would imply that voters receive no specific benefit from having river 
enhancement occur locally. If they care about river quality at all, they perceive it as a 
nationwide public good. Alternatively, a finding that the local quality coefficients are negative 
and diminish with distance would indicate that river quality is a local public good to some 
extent. In either case the nationwide average quality term is part of the constant and its 
coefficient cannot be identified.  
Estimation is based on the following empirical model: 
 
 mm
d
mmmmm I εφθ ++++++= ψZδxqγxβq m00Logit(yes) , (8) 
 
where β, γ, δ and ψ are column vectors of coefficients and θ is a scalar. In practice we focus on 
specifications that include only 1 or 2 local distance zones and interactions between river 
quality and abundance within a given zone.16 The reasoning in Sec. 3 leads us to expect that the 
cross partial derivative of willingness to pay with respect to quality and abundance is negative. 
We allow for this with the quality×abundance interaction term. We are aware that the 
responsiveness of preferences to the quantity, or scope, of environmental amenities has been 
the subject of intense debate in the environmental economics literature.17 Also, the theoretical 
literature on free-riding in public good provision has examined the possibility that the public 
good ‘quantity’ that matters to individuals may not simply be the sum of amounts provided 
                                                 
14 Greene (2008). 
15 This allows us to interpret our estimates as pertaining to a typical voter rather than a typical community of 
unstated size. 
16 It would be advantageous to have variables for river quality in additional concentric zones around each city 
center, to test for the presence of a local public good component at greater distances. If these omitted variables are 
uncorrelated with the quality variables we do include, their exlusion will not bias our estimates of local river 
quality effects. If there is a positive correlation between quality at the distances we observe and quality at greater 
distances, and if quality at greater distance zones also has a local component, then our estimated coefficients will 
be biased downward. In this case our estimated coefficients will partly reflect the effect on votes of quality at the 
unobserved greater distances. If the local quality coefficients were significant and negative in this case, the 
presence of a local public good component would still be supported, but the distance at which it occurs would not 
be correctly identified. 
17 For example, see Smith and Osborne (1996) and papers cited therein. 
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separately.18 For these reasons we examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative measures 
of ‘river quantity’ (abundance). 
We include an extensive vector of community characteristics described earlier (regional 
dummies, voting district dummies, language dummies, history of prior flood damage, etc.) to 
control for differences in tastes, but tastes may vary systematically across communities in ways 
we do not observe.  This would be most troublesome if the unobserved taste factor is correlated 
with variables of interest, in which case the corresponding coefficient estimates will be biased 
and inconsistent. If Tiebout-like sorting caused voters with particularly strong preferences for 
river naturalness to reside in communities where ex ante river naturalness is high, so the 
unobserved taste variable φm is positively correlated with yes votes and also positively 
correlated with initial river quality, 0mq , the result would be an upward bias in β, which we 
expect to be negative. If sorting took this particular form, our estimates will be biased in favour 
of finding no local public good component to river quality enhancement, which is our natural 
null hypothesis. While this direction of bias seems most plausible to us, we acknowledge that 
residents may sort on a variety of attributes and, as a consequence, the direction of bias cannot 
be guaranteed.19 
While recognizing that sorting could lead to bias, we note that the situation we study 
does not resemble the setting in which sorting typically has been observed—metropolitan areas 
in the US and elsewhere, in which communities individually decide on public education and 
other public goods (Epple and Sieg 1999, Epple et al. 2001, Schmidheiny 2006, Banzhaf and 
Walsh 2008). The basis for Tiebout sorting within a largely rural Swiss canton is arguably 
weaker than it is among districts or neighborhoods of metropolitan areas. School quality, which 
is a major reason for sorting in the US, is relatively homogeneous among the communities we 
examine as teacher wages and other factors determining school quality are set by the canton. In 
addition, responsibilities for environmental protection and natural and historical heritage 
conservation reside with the canton rather than individual communities.  
We begin by examining voting responses to variations in local river quality and report 
results from the simplest specification our model would support. The basic model is then 
extended to allow for two distance zones, for different patterns of response in different voting 
districts and for different responses in large versus small communities. 
 
Results 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate wide variation across communities in both river 
quality and river abundance in all distance zones. The variables we include as controls also 
vary widely across the sample. 
Table 2 reports simple correlations for the variables of primary interest, the proportion 
voting yes, river quality and river abundance in various distance bands. There is a significant, 
                                                 
18 See Hirshleifer (1983) and Cornes (1993). 
19For example, suppose older voters systematically prefer natural rivers, but older voters also prefer to live in 
urban locations where rivers tend to be controlled (non-natural). ‘Age’ belongs in the voting model, but is 
unobserved so it cannot be controlled; sorting on a preference for urban living causes age to be correlated with ex 
ante river quality. In this case part of the estimated correlation between yes votes and ex ante river quality will 
reflect age-related sorting and the effect of age on voter preference; the coefficient of primary interest, β, will be 
biased away from zero. The locational equilibrium model of Epple and Sieg (1999) emphasizes that residents may 
stratify across communities on the basis of more than one variable (income and public good preference in their 
analysis.) Bayer et al. (2007) provides evidence on the magnitude of bias that can arise from unobserved 
heterogeneity with regard to willingness to pay for school quality.   
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negative correlation between yes votes and quality in all distance zones, which agrees with the 
local public good hypothesis. For small distance zones within a 2 km radius of municipal 
centers river quality is highly correlated across zones, which makes it difficult to resolve the 
separate effects of quality in different zones. As a consequence we emphasize results only for a 
single aggregated zone, 0-5 km, or for two zones, 0-2 km and 2-5 km. No consistent pattern is 
evident for correlations between yes votes and river abundance. The only significant 
correlations are for the 0-2 km band, but their negative sign indicates weaker support for the 
referendum in communities where rivers are abundant, contrary to expectations. The link 
between support and river abundance is examined in more detail shortly. 
Our model implies that local river quality, river abundance and income all belong in the 
specification. We also consider a set of conditioning variables to capture variations in tastes or 
local economic or environmental conditions. Homeowners may perceive their stake in river 
restoration to be different than renters for at least two reasons. First, river quality benefits may 
be capitalized into housing prices; this would raise the price of housing services and would 
enhance the wealth of homeowners, but not renters. Second, renters typically are more 
transient than owners, so proximity to a degraded river at the time votes are cast need not 
imply any long term benefit. We include percent owner occupied for these reasons. Voters may 
derive different amenities from rivers in urban versus rural settings, which motivates us to 
include population density as a determinant of voter support. Population density would also 
belong in the model if congestion figures significantly in the enjoyment of rivers, although in 
the context of Bern this seems unlikely. While we do include population density, we note that 
it is highly correlated with percent owner occupied (corr. = -.88), so the effects of these 
variables may be difficult to separate. 
Voter support may well be linked to variations in the physical environment, which we 
represent with dummy variables for three of the four geographic regions in the canton, Jura, 
Alps and Prealps. Language differences reflect cultural factors related to preferences, and we 
capture these with dummy variables for regions in which French versus German predominate 
(regions in which the two are found together is the default). The proposed river enhancement 
was expected to cause construction activity and was supported by construction industry groups; 
we allow for this effect by including employment in the construction industry relative to 
population. Because a past history of flooding may cause a community to regard the local river 
as a force to be tamed rather than an object of preservation, we include the dummy variable for 
a history of flood damage. Finally, spatial heterogeneity that we do not observe may affect 
support in ways not captured by our controls. We account for this possibility by including 
dummy variables for 25 of the 26 voting districts in the canton. We find the regional and 
district dummies to be significant in all specifications but do not report these coefficients to 
simplify the tables. 
Table 3 presents 4 variations on our basic specification: models with vs. without district 
dummies and models with 1 versus 2 distance zones.20 The river quality and quantity variables 
are jointly significant at .01% in all 4 specifications. In keeping with expectations the 
quality×abundance interaction terms are negative in all cases and 5 out of 6 estimates are 
highly significant. The broad interpretation of this result is that the effect of local river quality 
depends on the local abundance of rivers (and vice versa). Because the interactions are 
generally significant, the effects of quality alone or quantity alone on yes votes must be 
                                                 
20 Apart from the inclusion of additional control variables, this “starting point” specification (model 1 in Table 3) 
corresponds to the “final” model in Schläpfer and Witzig (2006, table 4, last column). The pattern of significant 
(corresponding) parameters is essentially the same, except for population density which, as mentioned above, is 
highly correlated with the additional control variable ‘owner occupied’. 
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expressed as partial derivatives. Estimates and hypothesis tests for these partial derivatives are 
presented shortly.  
Income is insignificant in all 4 cases and inconsistent in sign, suggesting that tax 
obligations progress with income at approximately the same rate as willingness to pay.21 Yes 
votes show no consistent correlation with population density. (However, in models that 
exclude percent owner occupied as a regressor, population density enters with a highly 
significant, positive coefficient.) The dummies indicating French and German language 
predominance are significant in the models that exclude district dummies; the variable for 
French language predominance becomes insignificant when district dummies are included. 
High construction employment is negatively linked to yes votes, contrary to expectations, and 
the effect is significant at 10%. While we cannot provide a definite reason, one plausible 
possibility is that, while some construction groups stood to gain employment from river 
enhancement projects, others may have feared that a move toward preserving rivers in a natural 
state would block future construction in areas near rivers. The dummy variables for geographic 
regions and voting districts are highly significant when included. The dummy variable for prior 
flood damage is not significant. We did not have a clear expectation that prior flood damage 
would have a negative effect on yes votes. According to our media analysis, effects on flooding 
were not an issue in the pre-referendum debate. Moreover, river restoration projects today are 
typically executed with the additional objective of reducing the risk of flooding. Finally, 
percent owner occupied is negative and significant in all specifications. Considerations of 
benefit capitalization and transiency of renters led us to expect the reverse. While controlling 
for owner occupancy is appropriate on theoretical grounds, isolating the effect turns out to be 
empirically difficult in the present case. As mentioned above, percent owner occupied turns out 
to be strongly correlated with population density (and hence the urban-rural gradient) which is 
well known to be an important determinant in many voting decisions on environmental public 
goods. 
We compute partial derivatives of Logit(Yes) with respect to quality and abundance in 
order to consider hypotheses about their partial effects. Recall that a negative partial derivative 
of Logit(Yes) with respect to local river quality would support the hypothesis that river quality 
has a local public good component and this conclusion would be strengthened if the partial 
derivative diminishes in absolute magnitude at greater distances from community centers. The 
relevant partial derivatives, evaluated at sample means, are shown in the first 3 rows of Table 
4.22 The effect of higher river quality is negative and significantly different from zero when a 
single distance zone is considered (columns 1 and 3) whether or not district dummies are 
included in estimation, indicating a spatially restricted component of river restoration 
benefits.23 When 2 distance zones are allowed, partial derivatives with respect to quality in 
each distance zone are both negative and their magnitudes diminish with distance. The outside 
zone coefficients are not highly significant, however. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
                                                 
21 Schläpfer and Witzig (2006) found income to be positively associated with yes votes, but the effect was never 
highly significant and only approached significance ( 10.≈p ) in 1 of 6 specifications examined. Their 
specification differed in several respects from the specifications in Table 3. 
22 Using the notation in equation (8) the partial derivative of Logit(Yes) with respect to qj is βj+δjxj, where the j 
subscripts for β and δ refer to the jth elements in the parameter vectors. Point estimates and standard errors for 
these derivatives were computed as linear functions of the coefficient estimates in Table 3, using sample means of 
appropriate xj terms (using the lincom command in STATA.) Partial derivatives with respect to quantity, 
discussed shortly, were computed similarly. 
23 Schläpfer and Witzig (2006) based their conclusion on spatially restricted benefits on the coefficient from a 
model that excludes a quantity×quality interaction, which is not entirely legitimate in light of the fact that this 
interaction was statistically significant.  
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partial derivatives of quality in the 2 distance bands are equal for the estimates in col. 2 or for 
those in col. 4. 
We argued earlier that river naturalness may affect votes differently in urban vs. rural 
settings. This motivated us to include population density as a control and some of this effect 
may be captured by percent owner occupied. Incorporating such effects with additive terms is 
appropriate if the difference operates through a simple shift in support regardless of the local 
naturalness level. A simple additive term will not capture this effect, however, if the value 
placed on naturalness differs in urban vs. rural settings. In more urbanized settings, the local 
river may be a focal point of commercial, leisure and tourist activity; in rural areas most of the 
local rivers may be more integrated into the natural environment. We test for this possibility by 
amending the model of col. 3 in Table 3 to allow for different responses to river quality and 
abundance in different size municipalities. We use ‘total vote’ to define large versus small 
municipalities, with the dividing line set at 1000. Coefficient estimates are shown in Table 5 
and partial derivatives in Table 6. An F test on the coefficients involving DSmall interactions 
in Table 5 indicates that the response to local river quality is significantly different in small 
municipalities than in large municipalities. The partial derivatives in Table 6 indicate that local 
river quality matters more in small municipalities than in large municipalities. Estimating the 
model 2 distance bands, interactions, and separate treatments for large vs. small communities 
makes the model more unwieldy, but leads to similar conclusions; yes votes are negatively 
related to initial river quality and the response is stronger in small municipalities than in large 
ones.24 
 We observed earlier that the quantity of restoration anticipated in any local area should 
be greater where rivers are more abundant. This leads us to expect that, if river quality has a 
local public good component, yes votes will be more prevalent where rivers are extensive. To 
test this we computed partial derivatives of Logit(Yes) with respect to river abundance and 
report the estimates (evaluated at sample means) in Tables 4 and 6. In models with a single 
distance band (Table 4, col. 1 and 3 and Table 6 col. 1 and 2) the partial derivatives with 
respect to x are inconsistent in sign and statistically significant in only 1 instance. In models 
with 2 distance bands the quantity derivatives are significant in 2 (out of 4) cases but are again 
inconsistent in sign. None of the 8 quantity responses estimated is significant and positive. 
 Perhaps voters care that some threshold level of local rivers exist to be enhanced, but do 
not perceive benefits that are linearly related to abundance. We examined this possibility by 
defining a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if river density in a given zone is greater than 
1 km. of length per square km. of area (and 0 otherwise), and using it in place of the abundance 
variables defined earlier. (With the threshold set at this value, the dummy variable takes the 
value 1 in approximately one-half of the distance bands in our sample.) Overall, the results 
changed very little from those reported earlier. For the counterpart of Table 3 (cols. 3 and 4) 
the new quality×abundance interaction terms are negative and highly significant in both 1 
distance band and 2 distance band models. For the counterpart of Table 4, the partial derivative 
of yes votes with respect to this new abundance measure is negative and significant for the 0-2 
km. distance band, but inconsistent in sign and insignificant in the other two cases. The revised 
partial derivatives of yes votes with respect to the quality measures are only slightly different 
than the estimates reported in Table 4. 
 
                                                 
24 These estimates are available on request. Also, the response of yes votes to river quality is not significantly 
different in the 2 distance bands for large communities; for small communities the difference is only marginally 
significant. 
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Discussion  
 
Our key findings are two-fold. First, the benefits from canton-wide river restoration have a 
strong local component. Empirically, voter support is lower when local rivers are relatively 
pristine. This observation is consistent with the local public good interpretation if one accepts a 
simple diminishing marginal utility argument and the plausible voter expectation that more 
pristine rivers faced little possibility of enhancement. The related prediction that the effect of 
river quality on voter support should diminish with distance away from municipal centers is 
supported in point estimates for the partial derivatives, but the differences in partial derivatives 
are not significant. Second, voter support bears no consistent positive relationship to the local 
abundance of river segments, which we hypothesized is a good indicator of the likely extent of 
local public good improvement. The following discussion addresses both findings.  
 On the first point, the results indicate that the local component of benefits is statistically 
significant but they do not indicate the relative importance of local versus canton-wide 
benefits. While we clearly cannot estimate the relative size of canton-wide versus local public 
good benefits, we can investigate whether or not the local component was sufficiently strong to 
‘matter’ in the voting outcome. To shed light on this, we compute predicted yes votes under a 
counter factual situation where each community’s river quality variable takes the value “5”. 
Under the counter factual, each voter’s local rivers are pristine ex ante but river conditions 
elsewhere in the canton are at actual values. Accordingly, the counter factual gives the 
predicted outcome if voters expected the referendum to have no effect on local river quality but 
to enhance quality elsewhere. Using the estimates from cols. 3 and 4 in Table 3, we obtain the 
results shown in Table 7.25 Absent local enhancement benefits the referendum would have 
failed canton-wide, with 45.2-46.6% voting yes; the predicted yes vote under actual conditions 
was 54.2%. Further, only 77-87 (out of 366) municipalities would have voted to approve the 
measure in the counter factual situation, whereas the predicted vote under actual conditions 
resulted in a majority preferring passage in 210 municipalities.  
The results could be used to provide rough empirical guidance for assigning funding 
responsibilities between municipalities and the canton. Following the logic of fiscal federalism, 
the findings arguably suggest that a system of matching grants – in which cantonal support is 
conditioned on a contribution by the local governments – would promote a provision of the 
public good that is responsive to voter preferences. Regarding further practical implications, 
the result that the coefficient on income was non-significant in spite of a substantial variation 
in mean income in the communities (see Table 1) indicates that the marginal benefits of river 
restoration progress with income about as rapidly as the progressive income tax schedule (cf. 
model section). In public decisions, these result may usefully complement evidence derived 
using other approaches such as recreation demand models (e.g. Phaneuf and Smith 2005). 
The second point we discuss is the counterintuitive result that voter support for canton-
wide river restoration bears no consistent, positive relationship to the local abundance of rivers. 
This is surprising because, for a given current river quality, the extent of local enhancement 
that would result from the canton-wide program should clearly be positively related to the 
abundance of river segments in the voter’s local area. One possible explanation could involve a 
decreasing marginal utility argument. On the one hand, as mentioned in Section 3, more rivers 
suggest these communities receive more of the physical improvements. On the other hand, they 
                                                 
25 We compare predicted votes under actual circumstances (observed values for independent variables) to 
predicted votes under the counter factual situation; we thus hold constant the realization of the error term in the 
two circumstances. Predicted values for the proportion voting yes for each observation were obtained using the 
predictnl command in Stata.  
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enjoy abundant rivers and may therefore perceive smaller economic benefits from quality 
improvements due to decreasing marginal utility. An alternative explanation for an inconsistent 
sensitivity to abundance, or quantity, is that voters regard the good offered as “a local 
environment with high quality rivers” rather than a specific amount of river enhancement.26 
This might be motivated by a sense of ‘stewardship’—a wish to enhance or protect the quality 
of any rivers found in the local area, regardless of abundance. Similar non-responsiveness to 
quantity or scope has been reported in CV studies on natural resource damage assessment 
(Boyle et al. 1994; McFadden 1994).27 
 Another interpretation is based on recent findings from political science. In recent 
years, political scientists have produced evidence that voters are badly informed about the 
content of proposed policies. Nevertheless, poorly informed voters, even when facing complex 
ballot issues, often can make optimizing voting choices by following cues or “short cuts” 
revealed by the political debate (Lupia 1994, Lupia and Matsusaka 2004). Cues revealed by the 
identity of groups who support and oppose a given ballot measure can be particularly powerful 
in this regard. This finding may reconcile the consistent explanatory patterns usually found in 
the analysis of voting behavior with the frequent “anomalies” in survey-based preference 
elicitation. If the political scientists’ interpretation is correct, economic preferences will 
consistently reflect the local condition of a public good only at those spatial scales at which an 
informed public debate has taken place. In the present case, the requirement for voter 
preferences to consistently reflect river conditions within a radius of 5 km of municipal centers 
would be an informed community-level debate. However, according to our media analysis and 
personal communications, the debate between proponents and opponents of the initiative took 
place largely at the cantonal level. In this light, it is perhaps not surprising to find that local 
votes did not consistently reflect the local abundance of rivers, and hence the quantity of 
enhancement likely to occur locally.28 The same reasoning would seem to predict a 
corresponding insensitivity to quality differences, however, which is contrary to what we 
observe. 
 A caveat regards the observational nature of the data. Although we controlled for 
variables such as income, population density (to account for the urban-rural difference in 
preferences), owner occupancy and regional heterogeneity, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that the effect of river quality is due to another correlated variable. Furthermore, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that some voters interpreted the locally perceived river quality as the canton-
wide average quality. For those voters, the observed effect of local river quality would then not 
necessarily imply a local benefit component.29 Finally, residents may have sorted themselves 
based on preferences for ex ante river quality, in which case the corresponding coefficients are 
biased toward zero. If the differences between quality coefficients at different distance bands 
are also biased toward zero the rate at which benefits decline with distance and the importance 
                                                 
26 Kolstad (2000, p. 371) suggests this explanation for the anomalous CV results cited next. 
27 Rollins and Lyke (1998) argue that insensitivity of existence values to scope can be rationalized if one allows 
marginal existence values to be diminishing in a set of natural assets being considered for protection. This 
argument seems not to apply in the present circumstance, however, as the values involved are arguably use values. 
Rivers in most of the communities examined are a prominent part of the local environment and voters presumably 
‘visit’, or interact with, them regularly. Indeed, the frequency with which an average resident does interact, and 
the use values enjoyed, should be positively related to the density of local rivers. 
28 The voter preferences for the “local component” of the public good may thus be similar in nature to the stated 
preferences of an isolated survey respondent. 
29 This could yield the same pattern we observe because voters in communities where local river quality is low 
would perceive quality to be low canton wide, and therefore vote in favor even if benefits have no local 
component.  
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of the local public good component would be underestimated. We must acknowledge, 
however, that the bias could run in the other direction if voters sort on other unobserved 
attributes. 
Further standard caveats concern the assumptions underlying our use of aggregate 
rather than individual voting data and a relatively low turnout in the vote. Contrary to other 
applications in which relationships between individual-level variables and voting are the main 
interest, this standard issue in the analysis of voting is less prominent in the present analysis. 
Our main hypotheses relate to the role of environmental variables that are measured at the level 
of the municipalities. These variables are identical for the individuals in a local voter 
population. Regarding turnout, the political science literature suggests that turnout has 
surprisingly little effect on the outcome of votes as highly contentious issues tend to mobilize 
voters from both sides (e.g. Martinez and Gill 2005). Voting in direct-democratic votes appears 
to be less demanding than other forms of political debate and participation. In Switzerland, 
neither education, nor income, nor social status has any impact on electoral participation. It has 
also been shown specifically that the effect of educational attainment on participation in direct-
democratic votes is rather limited (Kriesi 2007). 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
For several reasons, referendum voting is a valuable source of preference information about 
public goods. In contrast to the hypothetical votes in surveys, the relevant geographic extent of 
the public good improvement and the distribution of costs are clearly and credibly defined. 
Moreover, the specific proposition has been the subject of political debate in which the voters 
are exposed to a variety of arguments from both sides. Our findings indicate that canton-wide 
(or state-wide) referendum voting on public good provision offers a valuable opportunity for 
analyzing how far the localized benefits of public goods extend, at least qualitatively.  
Results on the spatial distribution of benefits can provide a useful starting point for the 
equitable assignment of financial responsibilities between multiple levels of government in 
federal systems. A better understanding of the spatial distribution of benefits would allow the 
costs of improvements to be distributed between local and national governments in ways that 
reflect this distribution of benefits. If costs were shared in this fashion, our results indicate that 
local municipalities would be asked to contribute significantly to the financing of river 
improvements.   
Accurate information on the spatial extent of public good amenities could also be useful 
in the assignment of policy decisions to specific jurisdictions. If jurisdiction limits and 
financing responsibilities for such goods are not defined to coincide with the area over which 
benefits extend, benefits and costs will not be appropriately compared in ordinary collective 
choice processes. This is true with ordinary voting mechanisms, which do not allow expression 
of preference intensity. A policy proposal that would pass a straightforward benefit cost test 
may fail to gain majority approval if its benefits are concentrated in a particular region, while 
costs are spread across a larger area. Likewise, a policy proposal that imposes locally 
concentrated costs but yields benefits that are not locally concentrated may be adopted even if 
it could not pass a benefit cost test. In principle these problems could be solved by bundling 
together policies that incorporate spatially restricted benefits or costs in a way that results in 
positive net benefits for all localities. This would be complicated in practice, however, and in 
any case requires information on spatial benefit distributions. While we do not claim that our 
estimates can provide a sufficient basis for making such financing or jurisdictional decisions at 
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this point, they do illustrate that spatial analysis of referendum voting results can in principle 
be used to address such policy questions.  
Our finding that support for river enhancement is not consistently related to the extent 
of rivers in the voter’s locality is troubling, and raises questions about how heavily one can 
lean on these results for policy purposes. The possibility that this behavior reflects a 
stewardship motive is clearly speculative without further evidence; if true the implications for 
policy and the application of benefit-cost tests would be substantial. Alternatively, the lack of a 
consistent pattern of scope sensitivity may stem from the limited “spatial resolution” of the 
(canton-level) pre-referendum debate, which in turn failed to accurately inform voters on the 
likely spatial pattern of public good improvement. If so, the spatial voting patterns we interpret 
as evidence on preferences may actually be a consequence of the spatial scale of the political 
processes that voters relied upon for information to inform their voting choices.  
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Table 1. Variable definitions and descriptive statisticsa 
 
Name Definition N Mean SD Min Max 
Yes Proportion yes votes 366 0.5413 0.074 0 0.87 
Logit(Yes) Ln(Yes/1-Yes) 366 .2075 .3127 --* 2.04 
River quality (naturalness): 
q0-5 Mean naturalness in 0-5 km. band 366 3.05 .4655 2.113 4.87 
q0-2 Mean naturalness in 0-2 km. band 365 2.65 .8088 1.32 4.96 
q2-5 Mean naturalness in 2-5 km. band 363 3.12 .4799 2.14 5.00 
River abundance: 
x0-5 River meters/sq. km.,  in 0-5 km. zone 366 1121 419.5 136.2 2651.1 
x0-2 River meters/sq. km., in 0-2 km. zone 365 1199 597.1 31.4 3592.3 
x2-5 River meters/sq. km., in 2-5 km. zone 364 1109.4 428.5 20.5 2634.6 
d
iI  Mean income (1997, in 1000 SFR) 366 58.18 11.29 32.34 95.06 
Density Population density (pop./hectare) 366 11.00 10.60 .0186 48.08 
Constr. Empl. Construction employment/ pop. (1990) 366 .0420 .012 0 .118 
Flood damage History of flooding (dummy variable) 366 0.4757 0.500 0 1 
Owner Occ. % Owner occupied, 1997 366 37.48 17.82 10.63 83.39 
Dummies for predominant language: 
French  366 0.0501 0.218 0 1 
German  366 0.9091 0.288 0 1 
Dummies for geophysical region: 
Jura  366 0.1087 0.312 0 1 
Prealps  366 0.1363 0.344 0 1 
Alps  366 0.0740 0.262 0 1 
a Observations are weighted by the total vote in each municipality.  
* The community that reported all ‘yes’ votes was dropped from logit regressions. 
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Table 2. Simple correlations 
 
Variable Yes Logit(Yes) q0-5 q0-2 q2-5 
River quality (naturalness): 
q0-5 -0.4395* -0.4331* 
q0-2 -0.4511* -0.4415* 0.7270* 
q2-5 -0.4148* -0.4095* 0.9685* 0.5730* 
River abundance: 
x0-5 -0.0341 -0.0352 0.0840 0.1618* 0.0475 
x0-2 -0.2730* -0.2696* 0.2764* 0.3786* 0.2558* 
x2-5 0.0338 0.0316 0.0248 0.0819 -0.0122 
Notes: * indicates significant at 1%. Observations are weighted by total vote. 
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Table 3.  Testing for the effect of local naturalness. 
 
Variables* (1) (2) (3) (4) 
q0-5 .1550 --- .2855 --- 
 (1.69)  (2.87)  
x0-5 8.62e-04 --- .0013 --- 
 (3.55)  (4.12)  
q0-5× x0-5 -2.77e-04 --- -4.18e-04 --- 
 (-3.70)  (-4.62)  
q0-2 --- .1362 --- .1032 
  (2.76)  (1.99) 
x0-2 --- 4.09e04 --- 3.80e-04 
  (3.01)  (2.70) 
q0-2× x0-2 --- -1.68e-04 --- -1.47e-04 
  (-3.68)  (-3.19) 
q2-5 --- -.0194 --- .1194 
  (-0.24)  (1.43) 
x2-5 --- 1.82e-04 --- 6.55e-04 
  (0.72)  (2.15) 
q2-5× x2-5 --- -3.88e-05 --- -1.95e-04 
  (-0.50)  (-2.19) 
d
iI (mean income) -2.65e-04 3.65e-04 -8.94e-04 1.28e-04 
 (-0.20) (0.25) (-0.64) (0.08) 
Density .0019 .0063 -.0043 -.0037 
 (0.67) (0.22) (-1.41) (-1.20) 
French lang. -.4928 -.4856 .2560 -.0062 
 (-5.58) (-5.50) (0.27) (-0.01) 
German lang. -.5206 -.5262 -.6552 -.7271 
 (-4.55) (-4.33) (-5.73) (-5.55) 
Constr. Empl. -2.5183 -2.3122 -2.7696 -2.9601 
 (-1.74) (-1.60) (-1.99) (-2.13) 
Flood damage .0297 .0070 .0248 .0018 
 (1.07) (0.25) (0.83) (-0.06) 
Owner Occupied -0049 -.0051 -.0072 -.0067 
 (-3.16) (-3.20) (-4.65) (-4.15) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District dummies No No Yes Yes 
N 365 361 365 361 
Adj. R2 .40 .42 .51 .53 
* q0-5 and x0-5 are, respectively, mean naturalness and river meters in the 0-5 km. 
band; other q and x variables are defined similarly.  
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Estimation is by GLS; see Greene (2008). In all 
4 models the quality, quantity and interaction coefficients are jointly significant 
at .00001. 
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Table 4.  Partial derivatives of Logit(Yes) with respect to q and x. 
 
Variables* (1) (2) (3) (4) 
River naturalness 
q0-5 -.1518 --- -.1779 --- 
 (-3.46)  (-3.19)  
q0-2 --- -.0935 --- -.0983 
  (-2.75)  (-2.88) 
q2-5 --- -.0607 --- -.0877 
  (-1.21)  (-1.53) 
River abundance 
x0-5 -3.12e-05 --- -6.87e-5 --- 
 (-0.81)  (-1.17)  
x0-2 --- -1.11e-04 --- -7.61e-05 
  (-3.62)  (-2.31) 
x2-5 --- 5.53e-05 --- 1.94e-05 
  (1.35)  (0.33) 
     
* q0-5 and x0-5 are, respectively, mean naturalness and river meters in the 0-5 km. 
band; other q and x variables are defined similarly. 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Columns (1)-(4) show derivatives for models in 
the corresponding columns of Table 3. Derivatives with respect to meters in the 
two distance bands from col. 4 estimates are significantly different. We cannot 
reject the hypothesis of equality in different distance bands for the other partial 
derivatives with respect to quality and quantity estimates. 
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Table 5. Naturalness effects in large versus small 
municipalities. 
 
Variables* Coef. 
q0-5 .2203 
 (2.22) 
q0-5×DSmall -.0019 
 (-0.07) 
x0-5 .0011 
 (3.25) 
x0-5×DSmall 1.61e-04 
 (0.92) 
q0-5× x0-5 -3.40e0-4 
 (-3.46) 
q0-5× x0-5×DSmall -8.93e-05 
 (-1.54) 
d
iI (mean income) -.0012
 
 (-0.90) 
Density -.0031 
 (-1.01) 
French lang. .2154 
 (0.24) 
Constr. Empl. -2.5249 
 (-1.87) 
Flood damage -.0043 
 (-0.15) 
Owner Occupied -.0049 
 (-3.08) 
N 365 
Adj. R2 .55 
* q0-5 and x0-5 are, respectively, mean naturalness and 
river meters in the 0-5 km. band. 
Notes: Dummy variables for geographic regions and 
voting districts are included. DSmall=1 if the total vote 
is less than 1,000. The variables interacted with DSmall 
are jointly significant at .00005. 
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Table 6.  Partial derivatives of Logit(Yes) with 
respect to q and x. 
 
Variables* Small Large 
 Communities Communities 
 (1) (2) 
q0-5 -.2504 -.1568 
 (-4.44) (-2.25)  
x0-5 -1.12e-05 6.43e-05 
 (-1.94) (0.77) 
* q0-5 and x0-5 are, respectively, mean naturalness and 
river meters in the 0-5 km. band; other q and x 
variables are defined similarly. 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The differences in 
partial derivatives for large vs. small communities are  
statistically significant at 10% for river quality and at 
1% for meters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Voting results in counter factual simulations 
 
 Table 3, col. 3  Table 3, col. 4
 Predicted:  Predicted: 
 C-factual Actual C-factual Actual 
Popular ‘yes’ vote, canton-wide 46.6% 54.2% 46.2% 54.2% 
Number of municipalities approving 87 216 77 210 
 
